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The entropic uncertainty relation (EUR) is of significant importance in the security proof of
continuous-variable quantum key distribution under coherent attacks. The parameter estimation in
the EUR method contains the estimation of the covariance matrix (CM), as well as the max-entropy.
The discussions in previous works have not involved the effect of finite-size on estimating the CM,
which will further affect the estimation of leakage information. In this work, we address this issue by
adapting the parameter estimation technique to the EUR analysis method under composable security
frameworks. We also use the double-data modulation method to improve the parameter estimation
step, where all the states can be exploited for both parameter estimation and key generation; thus,
the statistical fluctuation of estimating the max-entropy disappears. The result shows that the
adapted method can effectively estimate parameters in EUR analysis. Moreover, the double-data
modulation method can, to a large extent, save the key consumption, which further improves the
performance in practical implementations of the EUR.
I. INTRODUCTION
The quantum key distribution (QKD) [1–5] is one of
the most mature quantum cryptography technologies,
which can provide information-theoretical provable se-
curity together with the one-time pad method. The idea
of QKD is to employ the basic principles of quantum
physics to ensure the security of random keys and to
use classical post-processing methods to find potential
eavesdropping behaviors. Based on the dimension of the
Hilbert space of the encoding, QKD can be roughly di-
vided into two categories. One kind of protocol is called
the discrete-variable (DV) protocol, in which the dimen-
sion of the Hilbert space is finite. DV-QKD protocols
have the superiority of long transmission distance, but
depending on high-performance dedicated devices such as
single-photon detectors. As an alternative, continuous-
variable (CV) protocols, which use the infinite dimension
of Hilbert space as the key space, give us opportunities
to achieve the QKD process via off-the-shelf commercial
components, e.g., homodyne detector and heterodyne de-
tector.
The first idea of the CV-QKD protocol was exploiting
squeezed states to carry the key information [6–9]. Then,
in order to weaken the dependence on the squeezed-
state sources, the coherent-state-based CV-QKD proto-
cols were proposed [10–12]. During these twenty years,
research on protocol design and corresponding exper-
imental verification was developing rapidly. Different
novel CV-QKD protocols have been proposed, such as the
two-way protocol [13–18], the discrete modulation proto-
col [19–21], the measurement-device-independent (MDI)
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protocol [22–28], etc., each of which has its own advan-
tages in different scenarios. Besides the protocol design,
the experiments also have made a tremendous step for-
ward with the progress of today’s technology [29–31].
The core of QKD is the security, and there have been
many security analysis methods proposed to investigate
the security of different CV-QKD protocols [4]. For
the convenience of the security analysis, the eavesdrop-
per’s ability is usually restricted to three different levels,
namely individual attacks, collective attacks, and coher-
ent attacks. Individual attacks and collective attacks are,
to some extent, to restrict the eavesdropper’s (Eve’s) at-
tack ability, so that the exchanged state between Alice
(sender) and Bob (receiver) can be treated as an iden-
tical and independently distributed (i.i.d.) state, i.e.,
ρANBN = σ
⊗N
AB (where N is the number of exchanged
signals), which can simplify the security analysis. How-
ever, a protocol is unconditionally secure only when it is
secure under coherent attacks, due to the fact that co-
herent attacks do not limit the ability of eavesdroppers,
thereby the most general attacks. In the case of coherent
attacks, the exchanged states between Alice and Bob do
not have the i.i.d. structure anymore; thus, the security
proof is complicated.
Diverse security analysis techniques have been de-
veloped to analyze the security of different protocols
under coherent attacks, typically the de Finetti theo-
rem [32, 33], the post-selection technique [34, 35], and the
entropic uncertainty relation (EUR) [36–38]. Those anal-
ysis methods can also be applied to analyze the quantum
random number generation protocols [39, 40]. Different
analysis methods have their advantages and disadvan-
tages, so they are suitable for the analysis of different
protocols (see [4] for detailed discussions). The advan-
tages of the EUR lies in its intuitive physical meaning
2(corresponding to the guessing game [41]) and the sim-
ple estimation method. Most of the work has been done
in the EUR in [36], except for the finite-size effect in es-
timating the covariance matrix (CM). However, in prac-
tical experiments, the estimation of the CM is always
achieved by limited data; thus, the finite-size effect not
only affects the estimation of min-entropy, but also the
estimation of leakage information.
In this work, we focus on the parameter estimation of
the EUR in CV-QKD, especially on the finite-size esti-
mation of the CM, and the modified estimation on the
max-entropy. The discussion involves only the squeezed
state/homodyne detection-type protocols and has no as-
sumption on Eve’s ability, namely under coherent-attack
cases. Due to the influence of the finite block length of
the key, the estimation of the CM is inaccurate in the
case of a short block length, compared with the ideal
CM estimation cases (as shown in [36, 37]). We exploit
the parameter estimation technique developed in [42] to
consider the estimation of the CM under practical block
sizes. Furthermore, inspired by the double-modulation
method developed in [42], we propose a double-data mod-
ulation method to estimate the parameters in the security
analysis effectively, and only one modulation is needed
rather than two, which simplifies the experimental struc-
ture of the double-modulation protocol. Since the ex-
changed state can be used for both parameter estimation
and key generation, the estimation of the max-entropy
is modified, and the statistical fluctuation of estimating
the max-entropy disappears. The simulation result shows
that the modified estimation method can, to a large ex-
tent, save the key consumption.
This paper is organized as follows. In Section II,
we review the composable security frameworks in QKD
and give the description of the discussed protocol. In
Section III, we discuss in detail the channel parameter
estimation process with finite-size. In Section IV, the
modified parameter estimation method is proposed with
double-data modulation. The numerical simulation and
discussion are give in Section V, and the conclusions are
drawn in Section VI.
II. COMPOSABLE SECURITY AND
DESCRIPTION OF THE PROTOCOL
In this work, we investigate the CV-QKD protocol un-
der the universal composable framework (UCF), which
can be seen in [43, 44] for the details, and the discussion
is under the coherent-attack cases. The UCF is of great
importance to compose sequential rounds of a protocol,
and even if some of the rounds are imperfect and deviate
from the ideal model, the UCF can well describe their
defects. A general QKD protocol can always be divided
into different parts; thus, one of the benefits of UCFs is
that even if part of the protocol is imperfect, this imper-
fection can still be applied to subsequent analysis of the
rest part of the protocol to obtain the final non-ideal key.
Another advantage of UCFs is that the final imperfect
key generated from a QKD system can be well quanti-
fied as ε-secure and then can be applied to other classical
communication tasks, such as the one-time pad scenario.
To illustrate the composable security of QKD, we first
use sA to denote Alice’s key and use sB to denote Bob’s
key. In the ideal case, the keys should be correct, se-
cret, and robust. Correctness means, for each round of
the protocol, the keys of Alice and Bob are always the
same, namely sA = sB = S. Secrecy means the key is
independent of the third part and only known to Alice
and Bob themselves. Robustness requires that, in every
round of the protocol, Alice and Bob can always gener-
ate a non-empty key, namely S 6= ⊥. If a QKD protocol
can satisfy correctness, secrecy, and robustness, the pro-
tocol then can be called perfectly secure. We denote by
{|s〉}s∈S the orthogonal bases of the key, by ρE Eve’s
auxiliary quantum systems, and by p⊥ the probability
of generating an empty key set. The perfectly secure
classical-quantum (cq) state between the key S and the
environment E can be shown as follows,
ρ
perfect
sE = (1− p⊥)
∑
s∈S
1
|S| |s〉 〈s| ⊗ ρ
s
E + p⊥ |⊥〉 〈⊥|⊗ ρ⊥E .
(1)
Nevertheless, a protocol is always imperfect with prac-
tical issues, resulting in the security deviating from the
ideal model. Therefore, the ε-security can be used to de-
scribe the practical security with imperfect features. We
denote by εc, εr, εs the smoothness parameters of prac-
tical correctness, robustness, and secrecy, respectively.
εc-correctness requires that the key in Alice and Bob’s
sides be different only with very small probability εc,
namely Pr (sA 6= sB) ≤ εc. εr-robustness requires that
the set of the keys is empty only with a small probabil-
ity, given by Pr (S = ⊥) ≤ εr. εs-secrecy can be treated
as the distance between the practical security and the
perfect security, in terms of the trace distance, given by
1
2
∥∥∥ρsE − ρperfectsE ∥∥∥
1
≤ εs. In summary, if a QKD pro-
tocol can contain εc-correctness, εr-robustness, and εs-
secrecy, then the protocol can be called ε-secure, with
ε = εc + εr + εs.
Let us start with the execution of the prepare-and-
measure (PM) version of the squeezed-states protocol.
The protocol can be divided into sequential parts, as
shown in Figure 1, which can be described by the fol-
lowing steps:
1. State preparation: Alice holds the squeezed
states with squeezed variance VS before the pro-
tocol begins, where VS ∈ (0, 1]. In every run of
the protocol, Alice uses Gaussian random numbers
xM to encode the displacement of quadratures by
using modulators (generally containing amplitude
and phase modulators), and the total modulation
variance is denoted by VM .
2. State transmission: Alice sends the modulated
3state in the quantum channel, which is treated as
a totally untrusted channel and controlled by Eve.
3. State measurement: Bob receives the quantum
state and randomly measures x or p quadrature by
an ideal homodyne detector. Resulting from the
fact that the practical measurement phase is always
discrete, the ideal measurement outcomes should
be discretized by the analogue-to-digital converter
(ADC). The final discretized results are denoted by
xB.
4. Parameter estimation: Alice and Bob repeat the
above steps many times until they have enough raw
data (e.g., N). Then, Alice or Bob reveals some of
the raw data (with length m) through the classi-
cal channel to estimate the key parameters of the
channel, especially the data distance d0 between
Alice’s and Bob’s data, the transmittance τ , and
the excess noise ε. See Section III for a detailed
explanation of the parameter estimation step.
5. Error correction: According to the estimation
parameters τ and ε, the communication parts esti-
mate the leakage information ℓEC during the error
correction phase and choose an appropriate classi-
cal error reconciliation algorithm, e.g., low-density-
parity-check (LDPC) code, to correct Alice’s error
(in reverse reconciliation cases) or Bob’s error (in
direct reconciliation cases).
6. Privacy amplification: Alice and Bob randomly
choose a universal2 hash function [45] and apply it
to their respective keys to get the final private keys
sA and sB with length ℓ, which are only known to
themselves.
Alice Eve Bob
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FIG. 1. Prepare-and-measure (PM) scheme of continuous-
variable (CV)-quantum key distribution (QKD) using
squeezed states. Source: squeezed-state source with squeezed
variance VS; Mod: modulators containing amplitude and
phase quadrature modulators with total modulation variance
VM ; Hom: homodyne detection; xM : Gaussian modulation
data on Alice’s side; xB: measurement results on Bob’s side;
Quantum channel: channel for the transmission of quantum
states, with the transmittance τ and the excess noise ε; Clas-
sical channel: channel for the transmission of classical data
during the post-processing procedure.
According to the UCF, one can write the upper bound
of the final key length ℓlow, even if the above steps are
not ideal, given by [43]:
ℓlow = H
ε
min (xB |E)− ℓEC − log2
1
ε21εc
+ 2, (2)
where Hεmin (xB |E) is the smooth min-entropy of xB con-
ditioned on the information Eve may hold, with smooth-
ing parameter ε, and ε1 is the smoothness of the physical
part of the protocol.
III. CHANNEL PARAMETER ESTIMATION
WITH FINITE-SIZE
There are roughly two parameters that need to be
bounded in the protocol. One is the smooth min-entropy
Hεmin (xB |E), and the other is the leakage information
ℓEC . We separately discuss the estimation of the two
parameters in two parts.
A. Estimation of Smooth Min-Entropy
There are different ways to estimate the min-entropy
under coherent attacks. For instance, the de Finetti the-
orem [32, 33], which can reduce the analysis from the
coherent attack case to the collective attack case, has
been successfully used to prove the security of CV-QKD
protocols with the source of coherent states [27, 46]. The
EUR has also been exploited to prove the security of
squeezed-state-type protocols [28, 36, 37]. In this work,
we focus on using the uncertainty relation to bound the
min-entropy of the key.
In practical experiments, xM and xB are always dis-
cretized. We denote α as the maximum discretization
range of the sampling interval and denote δ as the discrete
precision of the measurement, which satisfy 2α/δ=2L ∈
N, where L is the number of discrete bits. Therefore,
the measurement result will fall into different intervals,
namely,
(−∞,−α] , ... (−α+ (k − 1) δ,−α+ kδ] , ..., (α,+∞) ,
(3)
where k = {1, 2, ..., 2α/δ}. One can bound the smooth
min-entropy of the discretized data xB conditioned on
Eve’s information Hεmin (xB|E) according to the CV ver-
sion of EUR, given by:
Hεmin (xB|E) ≥ −n log c (δ)−Hε
′
max (xM |xB) , (4)
where c quantifies the maximum overlap of the two mea-
surements, namely c = max
x,z
|〈Xx | Zz〉|2 and X and Z are
mutually unbiased bases; hence, c (δ) is the overlap be-
tween discrete quadrature measurements related to the
interval length δ, which reads:
c (δ) =
1
2π
δ2S
(1)
0
(
1,
δ2
4
)2
, (5)
4where S
(1)
0 (.) is the zeroth radial prolate spheroidal wave
function of the first kind [47] and S
(1)
0
(
1, δ
2
4
)2
is ap-
proximately one if δ is small. The term Hε
′
max (xM |xB)
in Equation 4 denotes the max-entropy between Al-
ice’s and Bob’s data, with smoothing parameter ε′ =
εs/4ppass−2
√
2 [1− (1− pα)n]
/√
ppass, where pα is the
probability that the measurement is outside of the detec-
tion range.
According to Equation 4, in order to give a lower bound
of the min-entropy, one should estimate the upper bound
of the max-entropy using some of the raw keys during
the parameter estimation phase. First, the average dis-
tance, which quantifies the correlation between Alice’s
and Bob’s data, should be estimated, given by:
d
(
xPEM , x
PE
B
)
=
1
m
m∑
i=1
|Mi −Bi|, (6)
where we use Mi to denote the i
th modulating value and
Bi denotes the i
th measurement result, for i = 1, 2, ...,m,
respectively. If the data distance d
(
xPEM , x
PE
B
)
is smaller
than a certain threshold d0, the parameter estimation
step passes. Then, one can bound the max-entropy ac-
cording to Serfling’s large deviation bound [48], given by:
Hεmax (xM |xB) ≤ nlog2γ (d0 + µ) , (7)
where γ is a large deviation function, which reads:
γ(t) =
(
t+
√
t2 + 1
)[ t√
t2 + 1− 1
]t
, (8)
and µ quantifies the impact of statistical fluctuations re-
sulting from estimating “data parameter”Hεmax (xM |xB)
by “PEparameter” Hεmax
(
xPEM |xPEB
)
, which reads:
µ =
2α
δ
√
N (m+ 1)
nm2
ln
1
ε′
, (9)
where N denotes the total number of exchanged signals
and satisfies N = n+m.
B. Ideal Estimation of Leakage Information with
Infinite-Size
To estimate the leakage information in the error cor-
rection phase, we model Eve’s behavior by the entangling
cloner attack model, which is the most common example
of a Gaussian attack [49]. We point out that the whole
analysis of this paper is under the most general coher-
ent attacks and has no restriction on Eve’s ability. The
model of the entangling cloner attack is only for intuitive
understanding, and it is convenient to investigate the per-
formance of the protocol, which can be used to estimate
the lower bound of the key rate. Even if Eve’s attack is
not the entangling cloner attack, the following analysis
also holds, resulting from the fact that in a practical ex-
periment, we do not need to assume the eavesdropper’s
strategy in advance and only need to estimate the chan-
nel parameters by the existing data that Alice and Bob
hold.
The quadrature of the quantum state sent by Alice’s
side is denoted by xA = xs + xM . In order to ob-
tain the correlation between Alice and Bob after passing
through the channel, we assume Eve performs the entan-
gling cloner attack, where Eve’s state is modeled by a
two-mode squeezed vacuum (TMSV) state ρeE0 with the
CM γeE0 , which reads:
γeE0 =
(
ωI
√
ω2 − 1Z√
ω2 − 1Z ωI
)
, (10)
where ω is the variance of the TMSV, I = diag (1, 1),
and Z = diag (1,−1). The channel is modeled by a beam
splitter with the transmittance τ , whose CM is given by:
Sτ=
( √
τI
√
1− τI
−√1−τI √τI
)
, (11)
and the excess noise ε can be defined as ε :=
(1− τ ) (ω − 1)/τ . Thus, it is easy to deduce the quadra-
ture on Bob’s side after passing through the quantum
channel, given by:
xB =
√
τxA +
√
1− τx0 + xε =
√
τxM + xN , (12)
where xN =
√
τxs +
√
1− τx0 + xε. Assuming that the
squeezing operation is performed for x quadrature, the
mutual information between Alice and Bob reads:
Ix (A : B) =
1
2
log2
VB
VB|A
=
1
2
log2
(
1 +
τσx
VN
)
, (13)
and VN has the form:
VN = 1 + τε+ τ (VS − 1) := 1 + Vε + τ (VS − 1) . (14)
When Alice and Bob perform the error correction step,
they need to randomly announce part of the information
through the public channel, which is also revealed to Eve.
It is assumed that eavesdroppers can monitor all classical
communication processes; thus, the amount of informa-
tion leaked in the error correction process must be well
estimated and then removed from the final keys. The
leakage information ℓEC in the error correction step can
be described as
ℓDREC=H(xM )− βIx (A : B) , (15)
in the direct reconciliation (DR) case and:
ℓRREC=H(xB)− βIx (A : B) , (16)
in the reverse reconciliation (RR) case, where β is the
reconciliation efficiency.
5C. Practical Estimation of Leakage Information
with Finite-Size
In the previous works, the estimator of the leakage in-
formation ℓˆEC was treated as an asymptotic parameter,
which is independent of the total key length. However in
practice, the estimation of ℓˆEC cannot be accurate espe-
cially when the key length is not large, further affecting
the performance of the error correction. To take finite-
size effects into consideration, the estimator ℓˆEC under a
practical block length needs to be estimated. We adapt
the estimation method shown in [42] to analyze the char-
acteristics of the channel. Here, we only give the main
results of the previous work, and the detailed derivation
can be seen in [42]. In the practical experiment, the data
on Alice’s side is actually the modulated data xM ; thus,
the key of parameter estimation is to estimate the CM
γMB , namely γMB = [VMI, cMBZ; cMBZ, VBI]. The re-
lation of xM and xB (Alice’s and Bob’s data) has the
form of xB =
√
τxM + xN , where xN is the aggregated
noise with zero mean, and the variance is shown in Equa-
tion 14. The covariance of xM and xB is:
Cov (xM , xB) =
√
τVM =: cMB . (17)
For obtaining the estimator of covariance cˆMB, we also
use Mi denoting the i
th modulating value and Bi denot-
ing the ith measurement result, for i = 1, 2, ...,m, respec-
tively. According to the maximum likelihood estimation,
we can get:
cˆMB =
1
m
m∑
i=1
MiBi. (18)
and it is easy to compute the expectation value E [cˆMB]
and the variance V [cˆMB] by assumingMi and Bi are two
independent Gaussian variables with zero mean values,
which read:
E [cˆMB ] = cMB, (19)
V [cˆMB] =
τV 2M
m
(
2 +
VN
τVM
)
. (20)
According to Equation 17, we can get the estimator τˆ
of τ , which reads:
τˆ =
cˆ2MB
V 2M
=
V [cˆMB ]
V 2M
(
cˆMB√
V [cˆMB ]
)2
, (21)
where
(
cˆMB√
V[cˆMB ]
)2
follows the χ2-distribution, namely,
(
cˆMB√
V [cˆMB]
)2
∼ χ2
(
1,
cˆ2MB
V [cˆMB ]
)
. (22)
Then, we can calculate the expectation value of τˆ ,
which reads:
E (τˆ ) = τ +O (1/m) , (23)
and the variance is given by:
V (τˆ ) =
4τ2
m
(
2 +
VN
τVM
)
+O
(
1
/
m2
)
. (24)
Form≫ 1, which is practical in experiments, the term
O
(
1
/
m2
)
can be negligible due to the order 1
/
m2 being
small. Thus, we define new variance of τˆ under a practi-
cal block length, which reads:
σ2τˆ =
4τ2
m
(
2 +
VN
τVM
)
, (25)
so that the confidence interval of estimating τ can be well
quantified.
In order to estimate the upper bound of the leak-
age information ℓupEC , one should give the lower bound
of the transmittance τ . For practical purposes, we set
the failure probability of the parameter estimation to
εPE = 10
−10, which corresponds to the confidence in-
terval of 6.5στˆ , and one can estimate the lower bound of
τˆ low, given by:
τˆ low = E
(
τ low
)
:= τˆ − 6.5στˆ . (26)
According to:
xB =
√
τ (xM + xS) +
√
1− τx0 + xε =
√
τxM + xN ,
(27)
the estimator of Vε can also be calculated by the maxi-
mum likelihood estimation with the following form:
Vˆε =
1
m
m∑
i=1
(
Bi −
√
τˆMi
)2
+ τˆ (1− VS)− 1. (28)
In the case ofm≫ 1, the estimator τˆ converges rapidly
to the actual value τ asm increases, owing to the variance
of τˆ being negligible. Thus, here, we use τ to replace τˆ to
simplify the estimation process. Noticing that the term
1
m
m∑
i=1
(
Bi−
√
τMi√
VN
)2
also follows the χ2-distribution with
the expectation value E
(
1
m
m∑
i=1
(
Bi−
√
τMi√
VN
)2)
= m and
variance V
(
1
m
m∑
i=1
(
Bi−
√
τMi√
VN
)2)
= 2m, respectively, re-
sulting from Bi −
√
τMi being Gaussian distributed with
variance VN , therefore, one can get the following approx-
imation when m is large:
m∑
i=1
(
Bi −
√
τMi
)2 ≈ VN · m∑
i=1
(
Bi −
√
τMi√
VN
)2
. (29)
The expectation value of Vˆε can be obtained, which
6reads:
E
(
Vˆε
)
≈ 1
m
VN · E
(
m∑
i=1
(
Bi −
√
τMi√
VN
)2)
+ τ (1− VS)− 1 = Vε, (30)
and the variance of Vˆε can also be calculated, given by:
V
(
Vˆε
)
≈ 2
m
V 2N + σ
2
τˆ (1− VS)2 := σ2Vˆε . (31)
The upper bound of the variance of excess noise can
be given, also considering the failure probability of the
parameter estimation to εPE = 10
−10, which is:
Vˆ upε = E (V
up
ε ) := Vˆε + 6.5σVˆε . (32)
IV. DOUBLE-DATA MODULATION METHOD
AND THE MODIFIED ESTIMATION PROCESS
Inspired by the double-modulation method developed
in [42], we find that this estimation method is also useful
in the parameter estimation of the EUR analysis method.
Here, we slightly modify the double-modulation
method by pre-generating two sets of Gaussian random
numbers, namely xM1 and xM2, with variances VM1 and
VM2 and zero mean values, encoding quantum states by
new random variable xM , where xM = xM1 + xM2. In
this double-data modulation method, Alice holds both
data xM1 and xM2 in her memories and then generates
data xM according to data xM1 and xM2. The generated
data xM are used to modulate the quantum states. Af-
ter Alice and Bob finish the key distribution processes,
Alice reveals data xM2 to perform the channel parame-
ter estimation, and all the information about data xM1
is not announced throughout the parameter estimation
phase; thus, xM1 can be used for the key extraction step
without leaking information about the key during the pa-
rameter estimation step. The idea is very similar to that
in [42], and the difference is that this double-data mod-
ulation method only needs one modulation rather than
two, since we perform the pre-processing of two indepen-
dent random variables, which simplifies the experimental
setup of the double-modulation method.
Since all the exchanged signals can be used for both pa-
rameter estimation and key extraction, the estimation of
the max-entropy needs to be modified. Recalling that in
Section III, the key point of estimating the max-entropy
is to quantify the data distance d
(
xtotalM , x
total
B
)
. How-
ever, in traditional EUR method, not all the data can be
used for the parameter estimation, and only part of the
data (parameter estimation data) can be used to estimate
the total data distance, resulting in the statistical fluctu-
ation of the estimating distance, thereby d
(
xtotalM , x
total
B
)
is approximately replaced by d
(
xPEM , x
PE
B
)
+µ, where the
first term is the distance between the parameter estima-
tion data and the second term is the statistical fluctua-
tion of estimating the total data distance by using the
parameter estimation data. In the double-data modu-
lation protocol, we modify the L1 distance between the
key-extraction data xM1 and Bob’s data xB by exploiting
the absolute value inequality, given by:
d (xM1, xB) =
1
N
∑
N
∣∣xiB − xiM1∣∣
≤ 1
N
∑
N
∣∣xiB − xiM2∣∣+ 1N
∑
N
∣∣xiM2 − xiM1∣∣
= d (xM2, xB) + d (xM1, xM2) , (33)
where d (xM2, xB) denotes the L1 distance between data
xM2 and xB , which can be estimated after Alice reveals
data xM2, and d (xM1, xM2) denotes the L1 distance be-
tween data xM1 and xM2, which can be calculated on Al-
ice’s side locally. Here, we replace the number of param-
eter estimation signals m by N since all the exchanged
signals are used in this step. Therefore, the max-entropy
can be bounded after modifying the parameter estima-
tion step, which reads:
Hεmax (xM1|xB) ≤ N log2 (d (xM2, xB) + d (xM1, xM2)) .
(34)
Due to the fact that all the states are exploited to
perform parameter estimation, the statistical fluctuation
of estimating L1 distance disappears, which reduces the
finite-size effect on estimating the max-entropy, espe-
cially in the short block size regime, where the statistical
fluctuation cannot be negligible.
The remaining task is to estimate the confidence inter-
vals of the channel parameters by using data xM2 and xB ,
which is the standard estimation method shown in [42].
The quadrature of the received states on Bob’s side can
be rewritten in the following form after using the double-
data modulation method,
xB =
√
τ (xM + xS) +
√
1− τx0 + xε
=
√
τxM2 + x
∗
N , (35)
where x∗N =
√
τ (xs + x1) +
√
1− τx0 + xε is the aggre-
gated noise when we use xM2 to perform the parameter
estimation, with variance V ∗N = τ (xs + x1 − 1) + 1+ Vε.
After comparing Equation 35 with Equation 27, it is
easy to obtain the variances of the estimators τˆ and Vˆε
by replacing VM with VM2, VN with V
∗
N , and m with N ,
which are given by:
σ2τˆ∗ =
4τ2
N
(
2 +
V ∗N
τVM2
)
, (36)
σ2
Vˆ ∗
ε
=
2
N
V ∗N
2 + σ2τˆ∗(1− VS)2. (37)
7V. NUMERICAL SIMULATION AND
DISCUSSION
In this section, we focus on the simulation analysis
of the protocol with the finite-size effect, containing the
comparison of the protocol’s performances between ideal
and practical estimations of the CM and the compari-
son between standard estimation method and the mod-
ified double-data modulation method. The simulation
assumes that Eve’s attack is the entangling cloner at-
tack. We stress again that this attack model does not
affect the security of the protocol and is just for the
convenience of the simulation. In practice, we do not
need to assume the attack model in advance and only
need to estimate the correlation through the data in the
hands of Alice and Bob. The correlation between Al-
ice’s and Bob’s data can be verified according to whether
the L1 distance d
(
xPEM , x
PE
B
)
shown in Equation 6 is
greater than the threshold parameter d0. If the rela-
tion d
(
xPEM , x
PE
B
)
< d0 holds, we think the data between
Alice and Bob are correlated. Otherwise, we abort the
protocol. In order to determine whether the amount of
data is sufficient for the parameter estimation, one needs
to use the experimental data of Alice and Bob with a
finite block size to estimate the practical parameters and
to determine whether the finite-size effect is acceptable
by simulation.
We point out that the analysis using the EUR does not
rely on Eve’s attack method in the experiment, which is
due to two reasons. One reason is that the EUR secu-
rity analysis method itself does not restrict Eve’s abil-
ity [36], which means there is no need to assume that the
quantum state is a product state σ⊗NAB , like the collective-
attack analysis. Another reason is that the parameter es-
timation does not need to assume Eve’s attacking model.
The estimation of max-entropy only needs to estimate the
data distance d
(
xPEM , x
PE
B
)
by xM and xB . The estima-
tion of ℓEC needs the variance of the measured data and
the signal-to-noise ratio after transmission, which can be
obtained from the statistical CM directly. Using the en-
tangling cloner attack model to model Eve’s behavior just
aims at getting the lower bound of the transmittance τ
and the upper bound of the excess noise ε, and then, the
lower bound of the key rate can be calculated.
In the following discussion, we consider the squeezed
vacuum states with a squeezing level of 13.1 dB and
an anti-squeezing level of 25.8 dB, which has experi-
mentally been achieved at 1550 nm with today’s tech-
nology [50]. We set the reconciliation efficiency β to
95%, which is also easily achievable with CV-QKD’s post-
processing method [51, 52]. The excess noise is chosen
as ε = 0.01, and the security parameters are chosen as
εc = εs = 10
−9.
In Figure 2, we plot the key rate as a function of the
transmission distance, expressed in terms of km. The
lower bound of the key length is given by Equation 2,
and the secret key rate is calculated by ℓlow/N . The left
panel and the right panel are the performances under the
DR and RR cases, respectively. We give the comparison
between the ideal CM estimation and the practical CM
estimation with different practical block sizes, namely
107, 108, and 109. The solid lines are the protocol under
ideal CM estimation, and the dashed lines are the perfor-
mances under practical CM estimation. We can find that
the finite-size effect of estimating the CM will slightly in-
fluence the final key rates, and the larger the block size,
the smaller the impact. For a practical block size of the
order of 109, there is almost no influence on the secret
key rate.
In Figure 3, we plot the key rate of the protocol as a
function of the block size and compare the performances
under different transmission distances. In the DR case
(left panel), the performances under transmission dis-
tances of 3 km, 5 km, and 10 km are illustrated, while
the key rates under transmission distances of 3 km, 10
km, and 15 km are plotted in the RR case (right panel),
respectively. We can see that the block length of the or-
der of 107 − 109 is sufficient for the protocol under the
composable security analysis, achieving rates over 10−1
bits per channel use for transmission distances of about
10 km in DR and 15 km in RR, respectively. The results
also show that, in the case of short transmission distance,
the limited block length has a small impact on the per-
formance of the protocol, which will be weakened with
the increase of the block length. Moreover, in the case
of relatively long transmission distance (approximately
more than 10 km), the estimation of leakage information
with finite-size has little effect on the final key since the
case of long transmission distance requires a larger block
size for the error correction.
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FIG. 2. Comparison of performances between the previ-
ous key rates and the modified results under different block
lengths, namely, 107, 108, and 109. (a) shows the direct recon-
ciliation (DR) cases, and (b) shows the reverse reconciliation
(RR) cases. The solid lines are the performances under the
ideal covariance matrix (CM) estimation, and the dashed lines
are the performances under practical CM estimation consider-
ing finite-size. The reconciliation efficiency β is under a prac-
tical value of 95%, and the excess noise is chosen as ε= 0.01.
We set the security parameters εc = εs = 10
−9 and the de-
tection range to α = 61.6.
The comparison of the performances between the stan-
dard estimation method and the modified double-data
modulation method is shown in Figure 4, where the
left panel shows the performances of two scenarios un-
der different block sizes, while the right panel shows
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FIG. 3. Comparison of performances between the previous
key rates and the modified results under different transmis-
sion distances. (a) shows the direct reconciliation cases, and
(b) shows the reverse reconciliation cases. The solid lines are
the performances under ideal CM estimation, and the dashed
lines are the performances under practical CM estimation con-
sidering finite-size. The parameters are chosen as in Figure 2.
the protocol’s performances under different transmission
distances. We optimize the performance of the double-
data method by adopting the optimization method shown
in [42]. In the left panel, we plot the performances of
the double-data modulation method under block sizes of
105 and 106 and the asymptotic case, respectively, which
are shown with solid lines, while the performances of the
standard estimation method are depicted with dashed
lines, under block sizes of 108 and 109 and the asymptotic
case. It can be seen that, with the help of the double-
data modulation method, using less quantum states can
achieve better performance than the standard estimation
method in a short block-size regime, due to the fact that
the data fluctuation term µ in the previous estimation
method is not negligible when the block-size is not large,
which makes the statistical fluctuation of the finite-size
effect more significant in short key lengths. Thus, the
double-data modulation method can efficiently improve
the parameter estimation process when the block size is
not large. We also note that since we use all the states
to extract the key, leading to a high utilization of quan-
tum states, the key rate of the modified method is higher
than that of the previous method. However, the double-
data modulation method cannot achieve the transmis-
sion distance as far as the single-modulation method in
the asymptotic case. This is intuitive since the statistical
fluctuation in the standard estimation method converges
to zero withN going to infinity, while there still exit some
noises in estimating data distance in double-data mod-
ulation method, namely d (xM1, xM2), which will com-
promise the transmission distance. In the right panel of
Figure 4, we can see that the block length of the order
of 105 − 107 is sufficient for the protocol to support the
previous transmission distances with the block size of the
order of 107 − 109, which we believe, to a large extent,
saves the key consumption.
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FIG. 4. Comparison of the performances between the stan-
dard estimation method and the modified double-data mod-
ulation method under the reverse reconciliation case. (a)
shows the performances of two scenarios under different block
sizes, while (b) shows the protocol’s performances under dif-
ferent transmission distances. The dashed lines are the per-
formances using the standard estimation method, and the
solid lines are the performances using double-data modula-
tion method.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
In this work, we investigated the EUR used for the
composable security analysis of the CV-QKD protocol
and focused on the parameter estimation step, contain-
ing the finite-size effect on estimating the CM and the
improvement of the parameter the estimation phase us-
ing the double-data modulation method, which were not
discussed in previous works [36–38]. We believe it is nec-
essary to study the finite-size effect on the parameter
estimation in the EUR method, as well as its improve-
ment, since in practice, only limited exchanged states can
be used for the parameter estimation, making the esti-
mation process non-ideal.
The analysis showed that the finite-size effect of es-
timating the CM had a slight influence on the key rate.
The larger the block size, the smaller the influence. For a
practical block length of the order of 109, the influence on
the protocol’s performance was almost negligible. Thus,
in a practical experiment, if the amount of data is large,
treating the estimators of parameters as ideal parameters
will not have a great influence on the key rate. The result
also showed that the parameter estimation method devel-
oped in [42] was very effective at handling the finite-size
analysis of the covariance matrix in EUR analysis.
To further reduce the impact of the finite-size effect
in the parameter estimation phase, we also improved the
parameter estimation process by exploiting the double-
data modulation method, which was inspired by L. Rup-
pert, et al [42]. All the quantum states can be used for
both parameter estimation and key extraction, which im-
proves the utilization of exchanged states. After modify-
ing the estimation of the max-entropy, we found that the
finite-size effect was to a large extent suppressed when
the block size was not large, which saved the key con-
sumption, while the longest transmission distances in the
asymptotic case were compromised.
Our work is an improvement of previous works [36,
37]. We believe that the modified estimation method
9is practical by using less states to perform parameter
estimation.
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